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Abstract 
A self threat is an event that threatens our self-esteem, self-image, public image, social 
acceptance, or perceived control (Leary, 2009).   Research has shown that self threats, such as 
stereotype threat (Schmader & Johns, 2003) and social exclusion (Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 
2002), interfere with cognitive task performance, such as performance in intelligence tests and 
working memory capacity.  We are investigating whether another self threat, specifically 
mortality salience – bringing awareness of one’s eventual death– also interferes with working 
memory capacities and intellectual performance.  Replicating previous self threat research will 
allow us to suggest that there may be a common mechanism underlying the psychological effects 
of different self threats.  We predicted that thinking about one’s death decreases working 
memory capacity and intelligence test performance and impairment in working memory capacity 
mediates the effect of mortality salience on decreased intelligence test performance.  We tested 
our hypothesis with two experiments that included measures of relevant moderator variables, a 
manipulation of mortality salience, and measures of working memory capacity and intellectual 
performance.  Participants first completed several questionnaires with variables that have shown 
to moderate effects of mortality salience.  Finally, participants completed tasks measuring 
working memory capacities and intelligence.  Results from Study 1 (N = 43) found that mortality 
salience decreased cognitive test performance, but did not affect working memory capacity 
scores.  These findings suggest that the thought of one’s inevitable death reduces intellectual 
performance.  However, we could not find evidence for a mediating mechanism of working 
memory capacity.  Study 2 (N=44), implementing a different working memory task, showed that 
self-esteem moderated the effects of mortality salience on intellectual performance.   
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Mortality Salience and Working Memory 
Imagine driving on a highway and suddenly a car swerves into your lane causing an 
immediate reaction to slam on the brakes in order to avoid a collision.  An accident is avoided, 
however the feelings caused by the thought of crashing and possibly losing your life may linger.  
Such a near death experience can bring thoughts of one’s eventual and inevitable death into 
consciousness.  Making people aware of the inevitability of death has been termed mortality 
salience (Becker, 1973).  Threats to our very existence are powerful events and tend to make us 
question our sense of control and meaning.   Perceived control over your own life might be 
overcome by the idea that there is no control over length of life or the time of death.  Questions 
of sense and meaning might arise and the possibility that you haven’t been living life 
meaningfully could affect your self-esteem.   
Every day people encounter situations that threaten different facets of our selves.  For 
example, people get rejected, fear that they may confirm negative stereotypes about their groups, 
or are sexually objectified.  These situations tend to threaten self-esteem, self-image, public 
image, social acceptance, or perceived control (Leary, 2009).  A universal threat that affects 
every person is the eventual and inevitable end of life.   Now imagine that escape from death 
occurred on your way to take a college entrance exam.  Such an experience might interfere with 
your capacity to process and store information.  In turn, this is likely to affect your ability to 
recall mathematical calculations and solve verbal problems that are needed in order to perform 
well on the exam.  There is evidence that threats interfere with cognitive functioning, specifically 
working memory and working memory related test-performance (Baumeister, et al., 2002; 
Schmader & Johns, 2003). 
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Working Memory Capacity 
A plethora of different conceptualizations of working memory exist in the literature.  All these 
conceptualizations seem to converge on the idea that working memory processes include both 
temporary storage of information as well as attentional capability (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999).  People rely on working memory when reading a book, filing taxes, and 
planning a party (Miyake, 1999).  For example, when purchasing a new car, one must take into 
account several different factors in order to make an informed decision.  Some factors might be 
gas mileage, down payment, monthly payments, or the year manufactured. When comparing 
cars, active retrieval of information from memory about several different cars at the same time is 
necessary. The ability of a person to process and store information simultaneously is at the core 
of the concept of working memory capacity (Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 
2009).  Working memory capacity is defined as the ability to focus attention on temporarily 
activated information (e.g., differences between cars), while inhibiting other information that is 
irrelevant to the task at hand (e.g., what roads you will take to get home).  Research indicates that 
in completing complex intellectual tasks, working memory is more important than the 
availability of specific strategies and heuristics (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). There is some 
evidence (Schmader & Johns, 2003) that threats may be important factors that influence working 
memory capacity and might decrease performance on complex cognitive tests (Baumeister, et al., 
2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003), specifically intelligence tests, due to an impairment of working 
memory. 
Self-Threats and Cognitive Impairment  
Two examples of threats include stereotyping and social exclusion.  Both threats have been 
connected to cognitive impairment  (Baumeister, et al., 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003) but only 
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stereotype threat has been related to decreased working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 
2003).  Stereotype threat refers to the experience of being at risk of confirming a negative 
stereotype about one's group (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995).  A common stereotype 
concerns women and math ability.  This stereotype involves the belief that men are better at 
mathematical problems than women and earn higher scores on math tests.  Research has found 
that women’s performance was impaired when experimenters suggested that the test may be 
sensitive to gender (Schmader & Johns, 2003).  However, group-performance differences 
disappear when the same test is given in a stereotype-free environment (Steele, 1997; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995).  The main mechanism underlying this effect was decreased working memory 
capacity. Stereotype threats lead to lower working memory capacity scores and decreased 
performance on complex cognitive tasks.  However, when the stereotype threat was absent, 
scores remained unaffected (Schmader & Johns, 2003).  These results show that stereotype threat 
interferes with women’s math test performance by reducing their working memory capacity 
(Schmader & Johns, 2003).  
Another self threat, social exclusion, interferes with cognitive test performance 
(Baumeister, et al., 2002).  In one study, experimenters informed participants that there was a 
high likelihood that they would end up alone in life, in order to instill the anticipation of future 
rejection.  Results of three experiments showed that, in general, anticipated aloneness accounted 
for decreased scores in complex cognitive test performance, including an intelligence test and a 
verbal section of the Graduate Records Exam  (Baumeister, et al., 2002).  Unfortunately, these 
studies did not identify the mechanism underlying this effect.  However, unpublished data from 
our lab (Crocker & Mischkowski) suggests that reduced working memory capacity is underlying 
the effects of social exclusion on cognitive test performance.   
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Given that we find similar processes underlying the effects of two different threats on 
intellectual performance, this suggests that self-threats in general may lower scores on complex 
cognitive tests via impairments in working memory.  Based on this previous research, exploring 
the cognitive effects of another self threat is useful because it helps to build a general model 
about the similarities or differences on how self-threats exert their cognitive impairments.  As a 
consequence, we want to look at the cognitive effects of another self threat that affects every 
living organism—the eventual end of life.   
Terror Management Theory and Cognitive Performance 
The idea of death can be frightening and uncomfortable and thus most people tend to 
push away thoughts of one’s personal end of life (Becker, 1973).  What happens when these 
thoughts are brought to one’s consciousness?   How do these thoughts affect everyday tasks like 
reading, playing a board game, or calculating the tip at a restaurant?  Though mortality salience 
is a widely researched topic in the venue of Terror Management Theory (TMT;Burke, Martens, 
& Faucher, 2010) these are still questions open for further study.  Terror Management Theory 
(Becker, 1973; J. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1999) proposes that people are motivated to maintain positive self-images and faith in 
their cultural worldviews to protect against deeply rooted anxiety of one’s eventual death 
(Pyszczynski, et al., 1999). There have been over 200 experiments investigating different facets 
of Terror Management Theory (for review see Burke, et al., 2010).  Given this abundance of 
research, it is somewhat surprising that there has been little to no research examining the 
implications of Terror Management Theory on intellectual performance.  In an experiment 
looking at mortality salience and effort on a cognitive task (Paratore, 2007), results showed that 
when people were confronted with thoughts of their own death, they spent more time and put 
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more effort into a cognitive task.  This experiment allows for insight into effort on a cognitive 
task, but it does not examine performance on an actual cognitive task.  Another study connected 
Terror Management Theory with physical performance.  This research showed that  people 
whose self esteem was contingent on athleticism had increased strength performance on a 
physical activity when confronted with thoughts of their own death (Peters, Greenberg, 
Willimas, & Schneider, 2005).  These two lines of research suggest that cognitive performance 
would increase after receiving a mortality salience manipulation.  However, this hypothesis has 
not yet been directly tested. 
Goals of the Present Research 
 The present research addresses two missing links in the literature.  First, we tried to 
replicate previous findings about the cognitive effects of different self threats, with mortality 
salience as another self-threat.  By replicating threat effects, we can infer that self threats in 
general may impact basic and complex cognitive abilities.  This would suggest that there may be 
a common mechanism underlying the effects of different threats.   Second, mortality salience is a 
widely researched topic in the context of Terror Management Theory; however in relation to 
working memory capacity and intellectual test performance mortality salience remains 
unexplored.  This is our second goal, to expand the Terror Management Theory literature by 
investigating the effects of mortality salience on intelligence test performance.  Due to the 
limited amount of research regarding mortality salience and intellectual performance, our 
predictions align with previous results found with other self threats (Baumeister, et al., 2002; 
Schmader & Johns, 2003).  As a consequence, we predicted that mortality salience decreases 
higher cognitive abilities, e.g. logical reasoning or verbal comprehension – as it is often 
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measured in intelligence tests – and that impairment in working memory capacity account for 
these effects.  These hypotheses were tested in two studies. 
STUDY 1 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the effect of mortality salience on intellectual 
performance and working memory capacity.  We aimed to replicate previous findings of self 
threats reducing intelligence test performance (Baumeister, et al., 2002; Schmader & Johns, 
2003) and we predicted this reduction would be mediated by working memory capacity 
(Schmader & Johns, 2003).    
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were 43 undergraduate students from The Ohio State University (21 male, 22 
female) who received course credit for participation in an hour-long study.  Demographics 
include 97.7% were Caucasian and 2.3% had another racial background.  All participants were 
native English speakers.   
Materials and Procedure.  
  Most materials were presented on a computer, using MediaLab (Jarvis, 1997).  In 
addition, participants received a “Personality and Intelligence” packet, which included the 
materials for two tasks, specifically a word search task and a working memory task.  These tasks 
could not be implemented in MediaLab.  The packet also included a scratch piece of paper.  
The experiment included the measurement of moderator variables in the beginning of the 
study, mortality salience vs. control as independent variables, and measures of working memory 
capacity and intelligence as dependent variables. 
Blankenbuhler 11 
 
This experiment included groups of participants ranging from one to four participants.  
Participants were made to believe that they were participating in an experiment about personality 
and intelligence.  Using a cover story was vital to the experiment because the Mortality Attitudes 
Personality Survey (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) has been used 
as a death prime in most (79.8%) Terror Management Theory studies   (Burke, et al., 2010).  
Participants were recruited from undergraduate introductory Psychology courses to participate in 
the study and could have possibly learned in class about Terror Management Theory and the 
manipulation used to induce mortality salience.  If participants were aware of what we were 
testing, this might have influenced the effect of the manipulation.  To assure that participants 
were oblivious, we checked for suspicion at the end of the study and found that all participants 
remained unaware.  At the start, the experimenter received informed consent from participants, 
and distributed the personality and intelligence packet.  Next, the experimenter described 
directions for how to complete the working memory task.  In this task participants timed 
themselves on the computer, so giving them directions in the beginning was intended to reduce 
the amount of error.   
Moderator variables.  
Participants completed a battery of questionnaires in the following order: A measure of 
self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), fear of death and dying (Collett & Lester, 1969), religious 
fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 
1996), right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), and fear of negative 
evaluations (Watson & Friend, 1969).  These measures have been shown to moderate the 
mortality salience manipulation (Burke, et al., 2010).  
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Self-esteem.  Self-esteem is the second most commonly used within study moderator in 
Terror Management Theory research (Burke, et al., 2010). To measure self-esteem, we used a 
self-report measure, specifically the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965). This 
measure contained 10 items; participants reported on a Likert scale (1 being extremely 
uncharacteristic to 5 being extremely characteristic) about their dispositional self-esteem. For 
the complete questionnaire see Appendix 2. 
Fear of death and dying. To measure fear of death and dying, we used Collett & Lester’s 
(1969) fear of death and dying self-report measure. This measure contains 32 items where 
participants reported how disturbed or anxious (1 being not to 5 being very) they were about both 
the interpersonal and intrapersonal death and dying. For the complete questionnaire, see 
Appendix 1. 
Religious fundamentalism. We used a religious fundamentalism questionnaire designed 
by Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992) that contains 12 items in which participants reported on a 
Likert scale (-4 being very strongly disagree to 4 being very strongly agree) about various 
religious ideas. For complete questionnaire see Appendix 3. 
 Rejection sensitivity. To measure how sensitive the participants were overall to rejection 
we used a questionnaire developed by Downey & Feldman (1996).  This questionnaire was 
compiled of 18 situations in which they reported 1) how concerned or anxious (1 being very 
unconcerned and 6 being very concerned) would they be that the other person would reject them,  
and 2) how likely it would be that the other person would reject them (1 being very unlikely to 6 
being very likely).  For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix 4. 
 Right wing authoritarianism. We used a right wing authoritarianism questionnaire 
designed by Altemeyer & Hunsberger (1992) that contains 6 items in which participants reported 
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how much they agreed with the statement (1 being strongly disagree to 7 being strongly agree). 
Authoritarianism has been shown to correlate with religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992). For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix 5. 
 Fear of negative evaluations. To measure apprehension about other’s evaluations, 
distress over personal negative evaluations, avoidance of evaluative situations, and the 
expectation that others would evaluate oneself negatively (Watson & Friend, 1969) we used a 
questionnaire from Leary (1983) that contains 12 items.  Participants were asked to describe how 
characteristic each item was of them (1 being not at all characteristic to 5 being extremely 
characteristic). For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix 6. 
 Manipulation and filler task. The manipulation used was the Mortality Attitudes 
Personality Survey (Rosenblatt, et al., 1989).  Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions.  People in the mortality salience group were asked to “describe the emotions that 
the thought of your own death arouses in you,” followed by “describe what will happen to you as 
you physically die and as you are physically dead.” They had 2.5 minutes to write a short essay 
for each prompt.  People in the control group were given a parallel essay prompt which asked 
them to “describe the emotions that the thought of visiting the dentist arouses in you” followed 
by “describe what will happen to you as you physically visit the dentist and what will happen to 
you physically while visiting the dentist.”  This manipulation reliably induces mortality salience 
thoughts as shown in many (79.8%) mortality salience studies (Burke, et al., 2010).  After the 
manipulation, participants worked on a filler task, specifically a word search task, for 1 minute. 
Filler tasks in between the mortality salience manipulation and the dependent variable have 
shown to facilitate effects of the mortality salience by allowing the thoughts of death to fade 
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from consciousness (Pyszczynski, et al., 1999). For the complete manipulation, see Appendices 7 
and 8. 
Dependent variables. Afterwards, all participants completed the Trail Making Test as a 
measure of working memory capacity (Corrigan & Hinkeldey, 1987).  The instructions included 
a brief description of the Trail Making Test.  Participants were instructed that they would be 
presented with 25 circles distributed over a sheet of paper.  In Part A, the circles were numbered 
1-25.  Participants were instructed to draw lines connecting the numbers in ascending order. 
Following the written instructions, participants were shown a picture example. After the picture 
example they were told to click “continue” on the computer screen when they were ready to 
begin.  Once finished with the task, they were instructed to click “continue” again as quickly as 
possible to record the time they needed to complete the Trail Making Task.  After Part A, 
participants received instructions on how to complete Part B.  In Part B, the circles include both 
numbers (1-13) and letters (A-L).  Similar to Part A, they were instructed to draw lines to 
connect the circles in an ascending pattern, but with the added task of alternating between the 
numbers and letters (i.e., 1-A-2-B-3-C, etc.).  Participants clicked “continue” when they wanted 
to begin the task and a second time, once they had finished.  Part A has been shown to measure 
visual search (Nchez-Cubillo et al., 2009) however we were not interested specifically in this.  
The amount of time it takes to complete Part B has been used as a measure for their working 
memory capacity (Nchez-Cubillo, et al., 2009).  We used Part A as a covariate in all analysis 
involving this measure.  Afterwards, participants completed the General Mental Abilities Test 
(GMAT; Janda, 1996) which measures intelligence, specifically logical reasoning, spatial, and 
mathematical abilities. For both dependent variables, see Appendices 9 and 10. 
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 Background measures and debriefing. Then, participants provided socio-demographic 
information about their gender, ethnicity, and race. To make sure we maintained deception 
throughout the study, participants received an open-ended suspicion question in which they were 
asked to write about what they thought the study was about.  All participants passed this test of 
suspicion. Finally, participants were thanked for their effort and debriefed.  The debriefing 
information included description of about the real purpose of the study and reasons of why 
deception was necessary 
Results 
Overview of statistical analyses 
First, we used Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) to analyze main effects mortality 
salience condition on intelligence test performance and working memory capacity. Second, we 
looked at potential moderators of the effect of mortality salience on cognitive performance using 
multiple regressions following recommendations by (Aiken & West, 1991).  We used dummy 
coding for our analysis, setting mortality salience as 1 and condition as 0.  We also mean 
centered the moderators.  For post hoc analysis we recoded our dummy coding into control as 1 
and mortality salience as 0.  We also analyzed simple slopes with of high and low levels of 
moderators between conditions, and also differences between high and low levels of moderators 
within a condition.  This was consistent for all of our analysis. To gauge the size of our effects 
we report partial 2 in our ANOVAS and change in R2 in our regressions. According to Cohen 
(1988, 1992) a partial 2 of .01 constitutes a small effect, a partial 2 of .06 constitutes a medium 
sized effect, and a partial 2 of .14 constitutes a large effect.  With regard to change in R2 Cohen 
(1992) identifies a change in R
2
 of .01 as a small effect, a change in R
2
 of .09 as a medium sized 
effect, and a change in R
2
 of .25 as a large effect. 
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Main effects of the mortality salience manipulation.  
 Using Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) to analyze main effects of our manipulation we 
found support for our hypothesis that mortality salience decreases performance on an intelligence 
test. A significant difference (F(1, 41) = 4.44, p = .04, 2=.10) between mortality salience 
condition and control condition was found on intelligence test performance (for means, see Table 
1). No significant main effects emerged between conditions on working memory performance, 
F(1,43) < 1. This finding was inconsistent with our hypothesis.   
 
 
Table 1. Mean GMAT scores 
 Mortality Salience Control 
M 25.9 30.1 
SD 1.4 1.5 
 
Moderator effects 
 To deepen our understanding of these results we analyzed potential moderators of the effect 
of mortality salience on cognitive task performance; to do so, we used multiple regression 
analyses following the recommendations by Aiken and West (1991).   
 Fear of Death and Dying. We found a marginal significant interaction between 
mortality salience condition and fear of death and dying on working memory capacity, β = -.33, 
p = .06, ΔR2 = .05.  Post Hoc analyses revealed that in the control group, people high in fear of 
death and dying took longer (did worse) on the working memory task than people in the 
mortality salience condition, β = -.38, p < .05 (see Table 2 and Figure 2).  However there was no 
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difference in working memory capacity scores between people in high and low fear of death and 
dying in the mortality salience condition, β = -.06, p = .72.  In the control condition, people high 
in fear of death and dying scored higher on the working memory task than people low in fear of 
death and dying, β = .42, p < .05.  Finally, there was no difference between conditions in 
working memory scores for people who were low in fear of death and dying, β = .42, p = .53.  
We found a marginal significant interaction between mortality salience condition and fear of 
death and dying intelligence test performance, β = -.48, p = .05, ΔR2 = .08.  
 
Table 2.  
 
Hierarchical regressions of working memory capacity from mortality salience condition, fear of death 
and dying, and their interaction. 
Term B SE B β 
Step 1    
 Part A TMT performance 7.69 1.59       .61*** 
 Mortality salience condition
a
 --1.95 3.45 -.08 
 Fear of death and dying 1.77 1.74 .14 
Step 2    
 Part A TMT performance -7.92 1.56 -      .62*** 
 Mortality salience condition
a
 --2.64 3.38 --.11 
 Fear of death and dying 5.55 2.72       .44** 
 
Fear of death and dying x mortality salience 
condition 
b
 
-6.12 3.45    -.36* 
Notes. R
2
 > .51 (p < .001) in Step 1, ΔR
2
 = .05 in Step 2 (p < .10). All βs are non-significant (ps > .05), unless 
indicated otherwise.  
a
 Dummy coded with mortality salience = 1, dental pain = 0 
***p < .001, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
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Figure 2. Working memory capacity as a function of mortality salience and fear of death and dying. 
Means are depicted for low (-1 SD) and high (1 SD) fear of death and dying. Scale ranges from 0 to 70, 
with higher numbers signifying more time spent on part B in Trail Making Test. 
Table 3 
Hierarchical regressions of intelligence test performance from mortality salience condition, fear of death 
and dying, and their interaction. 
Term B SE B β 
Step 1    
 Mortality salience condition
a
 --4.46 2.22 -.33* 
 Fear of death and dying .29 1.12 .04 
Step 2    
 Mortality salience condition
a
 -4.99 2.16 --.37** 
 Fear of death and dying 3.01 1.74       .44* 
 
Fear of death and dying x mortality salience 
condition 
b
 
-4.45 2.22    -.48* 
Notes. R
2
 > .10 (p > .10) in Step 1, ΔR
2
 = .08 in Step 2 (p < .10). All βs are non-significant (ps > .05), unless 
indicated otherwise.  
a
 Dummy coded with mortality salience = 1, dental pain = 0 
***p < .001, ** p < .05, * p < .10. 
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Figure 3. Intelligence  test performance as a function of mortality salience and fear of death and dying. 
Means are depicted for low (-1 SD) and high (1 SD) fear of death and dying. Scale ranges from 0 to 40, 
with higher numbers signifying better performance on the GMAT. 
 Post Hoc analyses revealed that in the control group, people high in fear of death and 
dying performed better on the intelligence test than people in the mortality salience group, β = 
.44, p < .10 (see Table 3 and Figure 3).  However there was no difference in intelligence test 
scores between people high or  low in fear of death and dying in the mortality salience condition, 
β = -.21, p = .31. In the control group, people high in fear of death and dying scored higher on 
the intelligence test than people with low fear of death and dying, and this effect was marginally 
significant β = -.37 , p < .05.  There was a significant difference between conditions; people who 
were high in fear of death and dying in the control group performed better on the intelligence test 
than people who were high in fear of death and dying in the mortality salience condition β = -.70, 
p <.01. There was no difference between conditions for people who were low in fear of death 
and dying, β = -.04, p = .85.   
We found no significant interactions between mortality salience condition and self-
esteem, right wing authoritarianism, fear of negative evaluations, religious fundamentalism, and 
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rejection sensitivity in predicting working memory performance, all ps > .10, or intelligence test 
performance, all ps > .10. 
Discussion 
We found support for our hypothesis that mortality salience decreases performance on an 
intelligence test.  People in the mortality salience group scored lower than people in the control 
group ON WHAT?.  Using multiple regressions, we found that one moderator (fear of death and 
dying) qualified this effect. People who possessed high fear of death and dying, and were 
confronted with thoughts of their own death did significant worse than people with high fear of 
death and dying in the control group. In contrast to these findings, we did not find that mortality 
salience decreased working memory capacity performance.  As a consequence, we could not test 
for mediation because an effect of the manipulation on the hypothesized mediator is a 
prerequisite for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Further analysis of the effect of the 
mortality salience manipulation on working memory capacity using multiple regressions showed 
that participant’s trait level of fear of death and dying interacted with mortality salience 
condition in the control group, but not the mortality salience group. Participants who had high 
fear of death and dying in the control group showed lower working memory capacity scores than 
people with low fear of death and dying.  This result might be due to people who have a high 
fear of death and dying possessing an anxiety buffer against mortality salience, but not against 
uncomfortable feelings about visiting the dentist.  Also, given that the sample consisted of 
college students, we could assume that visiting the dentist is a much more common threat than 
dying.  This interaction might look different with an older population because older people may 
have a heightened awareness of their death. Future studies could look at different age groups 
tease apart the differences of types of fear between death and dental pain. 
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Study 1 provides evidence that mortality salience impairs people’s abilities to perform on 
an intelligence test which is consistent with research about the effects of other self-threats on 
intellectual performance (Baumeister, et al., 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003).  However, unlike 
previous research, we could not find evidence that working memory capacity, as measured with 
the Trail Making Test (Corrigan & Hinkeldey, 1987; Nchez-Cubillo, et al., 2009), was the 
psychological mechanism mediating this effect.  This failure to replicate effects of other self-
threats could have been due to the type of working memory task we used in Study 1.  First, we 
deviated from the way our measure of working memory capacity is usually administered.  
Normally, the Trail Making Test is timed by an evaluator and mistakes are accounted for in the 
end score.  However, to more efficiently run participants, we had participants time themselves 
and this might have caused errors; for example, participants may not have understood the 
directions and may have timed themselves incorrectly.  Also, previous studies have used 
different measures of working memory capacity which may tap into different constructs of 
working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003).  As a consequence, we used a different 
working memory task in Study 2 in which participants were only expected to perform, not to 
record start and stop times. 
STUDY 2 
 The purpose of study to was to replicate results in Study 1. To implement a working 
memory capacity measure that does not rely on participant’s ability to time themselves we used a 
different measure of working memory capacity than in Study 1.  Again, we predicted mortality 
salience decreases intelligence test performance, and this decrease is due to impairments in 
working memory capacity. 
Method 
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Participants. Participants were 49 undergraduate students from The Ohio State University (11 
females, Mage=21.4 SD = 12.3) who received partial course credit for participation in an hour-
long study.  91.3 % were Caucasian, 8.7% had another racial background and all were native 
English speakers.  We excluded 4 participants who left halfway through the study before 
receiving the manipulation. We excluded participants who scored two standard deviations below 
the mean sample performance in the working memory capacity and intelligence measures in 
order to exclude participants who were not motivated, which resulted in the exclusion of 1 
participant.   This reduced our sample to 44 participants. 
Materials and Procedure.  
The procedure of Study 2 was nearly identical to Study 1 with several exceptions.  First, 
we added another moderator measure, specifically the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS;Brown & Ryan, 2003) to our battery of baseline measures. We included the MAAS in 
Study 2 because research has shown that mindfulness moderates the effects of self threats 
(Niemiec et al., 2010).  Second, we excluded several questionnaires from Study 1 (right wing 
authoritarianism, fear of negative evaluations, and rejection sensitivity) due to time constraints.  
Finally, instead of the Trail-Making Test (Corrigan & Hinkeldey, 1987) participants completed 
an Operation Span Task (Schmader & Johns, 2003) as a measure of working memory capacity.  
In this task participants were presented with 12 sets of several sentence and word combinations 
(4-6 combinations; e.g., “I enjoy walking to the store”/dust).  For each sentence, participants 
were told to count the numbers of vowels included and memorize the subsequent word.  After 
each set of sentence and word combinations they received a prompt asking them to write down 
of the words they could remember from a given set.  The number of perfect sets of words 
remembered served as measure of working memory score; for example, when participants 
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recalled 4 words of a set of 4 words, they received full points for this set; however, if they 
recalled less than 4 words in this set, they did not receive any points for this set. We administered 
a different working memory measure because we wanted to avoid the shortcomings of the 
measure used in Study 1 and also use a measure that has been shown to be sensitive to the 
influence of self-threat (Schmader & Johns, 2003). 
Results 
Main effects of the mortality salience manipulation  
 Again, we conducted ANOVAs with manipulation condition (mortality salience vs. 
control) as the dependent variable.  Contrary to hypotheses, the mortality salience (M = 29.1, SD 
= 6.9) did not differ significantly in working memory capacity from the control condition (M = 
29.4, = 6.3), F(1, 42) > 1, p = .89.  Also, contrary to hypotheses, the mortality salience condition 
(M = 37.3, SD = 13.8) did not significantly differ from the control group (M = 35, SD = 13.4) in 
intelligence test performance, F(1, 42) > 1,  p = .59.  As in Study 1, we analyzed whether 
moderators qualified the effect of the manipulation on dependent variables, using Aiken & 
West’s (1991) recommendations. 
Moderators effects 
Self esteem. We found a significant interaction between mortality salience condition and 
self esteem on intelligence test performance, β = .47, p = .04, ΔR2 = .11 (see Table 4 and Figure 
4).   Post hoc analyses revealed that in the mortality salience condition participants high in self 
esteem tended to score higher on the intelligence test than people low in self esteem; however 
this was not a significant difference, β = .34, p = .15.   
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Table  4rchical reg 
 
ressions of interpretation of the article’s core message from coffee consumption, mood induction, and their interaction 
Hierarchical regressions of intelligence test performance from mortality salience condition, self esteem, 
and their interaction. 
Term B SE B β 
Step 1    
 Mortality salience condition -.39 2.21 -.03 
 Self esteem -.17 1.10   .03 
Step 2    
 Mortality salience condition --.095 2.12  -.01 
 Self esteem --2.12 1.49 --.13 
 Self esteem x mortality salience condition  4.57 2.10     .04* 
Notes. R
2
 > .00 (p > .05) in Step 1, ΔR
2
 = .12 in Step 2 (p < .05). All βs are non-significant (ps > .05), unless indicated 
otherwise. 
* p < .05 
a
 Dummy coded with mortality salience = 1, dental pain = 0 
 
  
Figure 4. Intelligence test performance as a function of mortality salience and self esteem. Means are 
depicted for low (-1 SD) and high (1 SD) self esteem. Scale ranges from 0 to 35, with higher numbers 
signifying better scores on the GMAT. 
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We found the opposite pattern in the control condition; here, participants low in self esteem 
tended to score higher on the intelligence test than people high in self esteem; again, this was not 
statistically significant, β = -.35, p = .11.  We also found that for people low in self esteem who 
were in the control condition scored higher on the intelligence test than people who were in the 
mortality salience condition, however, this was not significant β = -.32, p = .16.   Finally, when 
high in self esteem participants who were in the mortality salience condition scored higher on the 
intelligence test than people in the control condition, β = 3.73, p = .11. 
 We also found a marginally significant interaction between mortality salience condition 
and self esteem on working memory performance, β = .38, p < .10, ΔR2 = .07 (see Table 5 and 
Figure 5).  Post hoc analyses revealed that in the mortality salience condition there was no 
difference between people who had high self esteem or low self esteem on working memory 
capacity scores, β = .30, p = .20.  
Table 5 regressions of interpretation of the article’s core message from coffee consumption, mood induction, and their interaction 
Hierarchical regressions of working memory capacity from mortality salience condition, self esteem, and 
their interaction. 
Term B SE B β 
Step 1    
 Mortality salience condition
 a
 2.12 4.52 .08 
 Self esteem -.27 2.23  .02 
Step 2    
 Mortality salience condition
 a
 -2.62 4.44  ..1 
 Self esteem --3.53 3.12 -.-.26 
 Self esteem x mortality salience condition
 a
 7.57 4.41   .38 
Notes. R
2
 > .01 (p > .05) in Step 1, ΔR
2
 = .08 in Step 2 (p < .10). All βs are non-significant (ps > .05), unless 
indicated otherwise. 
a
 Dummy coded with mortality salience = 1, dental pain  
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Figure 5. Working memory capacity as a function of mortality salience and self esteem. Means are 
depicted for low (-1 SD) and high (1 SD) self esteem. Scale ranges from 20 to 45, with higher numbers 
signifying better scores on the working memory task. 
 
Similarly there was no significant difference in intelligence test performance between people 
high and low in self-esteem in the control condition, β = -.26, p = .27.  We also found no 
difference in working memory capacity scores between conditions for people low self esteem, 
β = -.18, p = .42. When high in self-esteem, participants in the mortality salience condition 
tended to score higher on the working memory task than people in the control condition; 
however this was not significant, β = .37, p = .12. We found no other significant interactions of 
mortality salience condition with the other moderators we investigated, specifically fear of death 
and dying, religious fundamentalism, and mindfulness, in predicting working memory capacity 
or intelligence test performance (ps > .23). 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, we were unable to replicate threat effects on either intelligence test performance 
or working memory capacity. However, we found that self esteem moderated mortality salience 
effects.  We found our results of self esteem to be consistent with previously shown literature 
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such acting as an anxiety buffer against one’s eventual and inevitable end to life (Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Schmeichel et al., 2009).  This means in both 
intelligence test performance and working memory capacity individuals who were high in self 
esteem were able to buffer against and remain unaffected by the mortality salience threat.   The 
failure to replicate main effects of mortality salience on intellectual performance from Study 1 
could be due to this effect as well as the effect of mortality salience on working memory 
capacity. 
General Discussion 
 Our main intention for these studies was to replicate previous self threat effects on 
intelligence test performance.  In Study 1, we were able to replicate threat effects on intelligence 
test performance but not working memory capacity. Neither of our original hypotheses were 
supported in Study 2; however, self-esteem moderated the effects of mortality salience on 
intelligence test performance and working memory capacity.  
 Several factors might influence why we were unable to replicate main effects of Study 1 
in Study 2. Perhaps the most profound reason was that self-esteem moderated mortality salience 
effects:  There was a trend that people who possessed high self esteem remained unaffected by 
the mortality salience manipulation in both intelligence test scores and working memory scores.  
As previously stated, self esteem has been shown to be an anxiety buffer against threats to 
people’s very existence (Pyszczynski, et al., 2004).  We were able to replicate this finding from 
the Terror Management Theory literature (Burke, et al., 2010). 
 Though this line of research was geared toward producing evidence that reduced working 
memory capacity is the process underlying intellectual impairments after existential threat, it is 
possible that working memory capacity is not the mechanism for our effects of mortality salience 
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on decreased intelligence test performance.  This would suggest that our preliminary idea – that 
working memory capacity is the main mechanism underlying the effects of self-threats in general 
– is limited and needs to be modified.  In this case, other mechanisms such as motivation 
(Fritsche, Jonas, Fankh, & nel, 2008) should be investigated as potential mechanisms.  
 Another reason why we did not replicate effects of the first study in Study 2 could be 
attributed to the length of the delay between the manipulation and the dependent variables. In the 
dual-process theory of proximal and distal defenses (Jeff Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
Simon, & Breus, 1994; Jeff Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, et al., 
1999) states that people use proximal defenses right after a mortality salience manipulation.  
When using proximal defenses threat effects disappear; however when there is a time delay 
following mortality salience distal defenses are activated.  Distal defenses allow for an increase 
in accessibility of death-related thought, but not conscious thought of death.   In Study 1, after 
the manipulation participants completed a word search puzzle for one minute followed by two 
dependent variables - the Trail Making Test (Corrigan & Hinkeldey, 1987) and then the GMAT 
(Janda, 1996).   The word search and the Trail Making Task account for about ( 6-8 minutes) 
until participants started on the intelligence test.  The 6-8 minutes in between the manipulation 
and the intelligence test might have allowed for the death threat to move into a distal defense 
position, explaining why their working memory scores were unaffected but their intelligence test 
scores were reduced.  In other words, the Trail Making Test could have been acting as a second 
filler task, allowing participants to engage in distal defense when taking the intelligence test.  In 
the distal defense, people are trying to bolster the anxiety of one’s own death and this might be 
cognitively draining and also mentally distracting.  This might explain why their scores were 
reduced. However, further research would be necessary to see if one or two filler tasks make a 
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difference in intelligence test performance.  Contrary to Study 1, Study 2 had a much longer 
working memory task ( 12-15 minutes total). Perhaps due to this longer delay between the 
manipulation and the dependent variable the accessibility of death-related thought (distal 
defenses) might have been surpassed, providing an explanation for why there was no significant 
change in intelligence test scores.   
 Potential limitations of both studies include the strength of the mortality salience 
manipulation.  Further directions could increase the strength of mortality salience by hosting 
experiments in cubicles instead of groups ranging from one to four.  Putting participants in 
separate rooms might eliminate possible distractions of other people.  Additionally, the air 
conditioning in the room we used was abnormally loud which could have been a distraction.  
Adding another death prime such as a picture of a tombstone, reading a letter about visiting a 
morgue, or even holding the experiment at a place nearby a cemetery might be effective in 
inducing a more intense mortality salience prime. Another potential limitation was our sample. 
We relied on College students, who are relatively young population and thus may not be affected 
by mortality salience as much as older people; for older people thoughts about their own death 
may be more frightening than for younger people.  Thus, using older samples could increase 
effects of mortality salience on intelligence test performance.  
 Further replication is needed to see if mortality salience does significantly decrease 
intelligence test performance.  Our marginal results of reduced intelligence test performance in 
Study 1 indicate that this is the case.  Death is important to all people, because we all have to 
face it ultimately.  As another future directions of particular importance to me would be to 
replicate Study 1 in a high school located in a high violence neighborhood or city. Students in 
these areas might experience mortality salience every day when walking to class or coming home 
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from class.  If we can understand how mortality salience affects cognitive performance, we 
might be able to implement programs about how to combat mortality effects in schools that have 
kids who might be confronted with mortality salience every day.  Also, understanding mortality 
salience’s effects on cognitive importance might be of high value to help military personnel who 
often have to make complex cognitive decisions while in the face of their own death during 
combat.  Clarifying mortality salience effects on cognitive performance is the first step for 
combating these effects.  Interventions of self-esteem would be the first step to give insight into 
these cognitively impairing effects. 
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 Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (modified from Rosenberg, 1965) 
 
Please read each item below and then indicate how well each statement describes you using the following 
response scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
extremely     extremely 
uncharacteristic   characteristic 
 
______ 1.  On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
______ 2.  At times I think I am no good at all. REV 
______ 3.  I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
______ 4.  I am unable to do things as well as most other people. REV 
______ 5.  I feel I do not have much to be proud of. REV 
______ 6.  I certainly feel useless at times. REV 
______ 7.  I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
______ 8.  I wish I could have more respect for myself. REV 
______ 9.  All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. REV 
______ 10.  I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
 
 
Blankenbuhler 36 
 
Appendix 2: Fear of Death and Dying (Collett & Lester, 1969): 
REVISED COLLETT-LESTER FEAR OF DEATH AND DYING SCALE 
How disturbed or made anxious are you by the following aspects of death and dying? 
Read each item and answer it quickly. Don’t spend too much time thinking about your 
response. We want your first impression of how you think right now. Circle the number 
that best represents your feeling. 
 
Your Own Death very somewhat not 
1. The total isolation of death    5 4 3 2 1 
2. The shortness of life     5 4 3 2 1 
3. Missing out on so much after you die  5 4 3 2 1 
4. Dying young   5 4 3 2 1 
5. How it will feel to be dead    5 4 3 2 1 
6. Never thinking or experiencing    5 4 3 2 1 
7. The possibility of pain and punishment during life-after-death 5 4 3 2 1 
8. The disintegration of your body after you die  5 4 3 2 1 
 
Your Own Dying very somewhat not 
1. The physical degeneration involved    5 4 3 2 1 
2. The pain involved in dying    5 4 3 2 1 
3. The intellectual degeneration of old age   5 4 3 2 1 
4. That your abilities will be limited as you lie dying    5 4 3 2 1 
5. The uncertainty as to how bravely you will face the process of dying    5 4 3 2 1 
6. Your lack of control over the process of dying    5 4 3 2 1 
7. The possibility of dying in a hospital away from friends and family    5 4 3 2 1 
8. The grief of others as you lie dying    5 4 3 2 1 
 
The Death of Others very somewhat not 
1. The loss of someone close to you   5 4 3 2 1 
2. Having to see their dead body    5 4 3 2 1 
3. Never being able to communicate with them again  5 4 3 2 1 
4. Regret over not being nicer to then when they were alive  5 4 3 2 1 
5. Growing old alone without them    5 4 3 2 1 
6. Feeling guilty that you are relieved that they are dead    5 4 3 2 1 
7. Feeling lonely without them    5 4 3 2 1 
8. Envious that they are dead    5 4 3 2 1 
 
The Dying of Others very somewhat not 
1. Having to be with someone who is dying   5 4 3 2 1 
2. Having them want to talk about death to you    5 4 3 2 1 
3. Watching then suffer from pain   5 4 3 2 1 
4. Having to be the one to tell them they are dying   5 4 3 2 1 
5. Seeing the physical degeneration of their body 5 4 3 2 1 
6. Not knowing what to do about their grief at losing them when you are with them   5 4 3 2 1 
7. Watching the deterioration of their mental abilities  5 4 3 2 1 
8. Being reminded that you are going to go through the experience also one day 5 4 3 2 1 
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Appendix 3:  Religious Fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992): 
You will probably find that you agree with some of the following statements, and disagree with 
others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement according to the 
following scale: 
-4 = You very strongly disagree with the statement. 
-3 = You strongly disagree with the statement. 
-2 = You moderately disagree with the statement. 
-1 = You slightly disagree with the statement. 
0 = You feel exactly and precisely neutral about the statement. 
1 = You slightly agree with the statement. 
2 = You moderately agree with the statement. 
3 = You strongly agree with the statement. 
4 = You very strongly agree with the statement. 
Important: You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a 
statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (“-4”) with one idea in a statement, but 
slightly agree (“+1”) with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine 
your reactions, and [record] how you feel on balance (a “-3” in this case). 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be 
totally followed 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4  
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 R 
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting 
against God 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 R 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go any 
“deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4   
6. when you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the 
Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should not be considered completely, literally true 
from beginning to end R 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
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8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion 
 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a 
diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 R 
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 R 
11.  The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with 
others’ beliefs  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true, right 
religion  
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 R 
 
Appendix 4: Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Downey & Feldman, 1996) 
 
 
Each of the items below describes things college students sometimes ask of other people.  Please imagine 
that you are in each situation.  You will be asked to answer the following questions: 
 
 1) How concerned or anxious would you be about how the other person would  respond? 
 
 2)  How do you think the other person would be likely to respond? 
 
 
1.  You ask someone in class if you can borrow his/her notes. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not the person would want to lend you his/her notes?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that the person would willingly give me  very unlikely  very likely 
 his/her notes.       1        2       3       4       5       6 
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2.  You ask your boyfriend/girlfriend to move in with you. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not the person would want to move in with you?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would want to move in very unlikely  very likely 
 with me.        1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
3.  You ask your parents for help in deciding what programs to apply to. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your parents would want to help you?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that they would want to help me.   very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
4.  You ask someone you don’t know well out on a date. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not the person would want to go out with you?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that the person would want to go out with  very unlikely  very likely 
 me.        1        2       3       4       5       6 
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5.  Your boyfriend/girlfriend has plans to go out with friends tonight, but you really want to spend 
the evening with him/her, and you tell him/her so. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your boyfriend/girlfriend would decide to stay in?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that the person would willingly choose  very unlikely  very likely 
 to stay in.      1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
6.  You ask your parents for extra money to cover living expenses. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your parents would help you out?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that my parents would not mind helping   very unlikely  very likely 
 me out.        1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
7.  After class, you tell your professor that you have been having some trouble with a section of the 
course and ask if he/she can give you some extra help. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your professor would want to help you out?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that my professor would want to help  very unlikely  very likely 
 me out.        1        2       3       4       5       6 
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8.  You approach a close friend to talk after doing or saying something that seriously upset him/her. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your friend would want to talk with you?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would want to talk with me  very unlikely  very likely 
 to try to work things out.      1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
9.  You ask someone in one of your classes to coffee. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not the person would want to go?     1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that the person would  want to go  very unlikely  very likely 
 with me.        1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
10.  After graduation, you can’t find a job and ask your parents if you can live at home for a while. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your parents would want you to come home?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect I would be welcome at home.   very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
11.  You ask your friend to go on a vacation with you over Spring Break. 
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 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your friend would want to go with you?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would want to go with me.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
12.  You call your boyfriend/girlfriend after a bitter argument and tell him/her you want to see 
him/her. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your boyfriend/girlfriend would want to see you?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would want to see me.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
13.  You ask a friend if you can borrow something of his/hers. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your friend would want to loan it to you?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would willingly loan me it.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
14.  You ask your parents to come to an occasion important to you. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your parents would want to come?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
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 I would expect that my parents would want to come.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
15.  You ask a friend to do you a big favor. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your  friend would do this favor?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would willingly do    very unlikely  very likely 
 this favor for me.       1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
16.  You ask your boyfriend/girlfriend if he/she really loves you. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your boyfriend/girlfriend would say yes?    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 I would expect that he/she would answer yes sincerely.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
 
 
17.  You go to a party and notice someone on the other side of the room and then you ask them to 
dance. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not the person would want to dance with you?   1        2       3       4       5       6 
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 I would expect that he/she would want to dance with me.  very unlikely  very likely 
         1        2       3       4       5       6 
18.  You ask your boyfriend/girlfriend to come home to meet your parents. 
 
 How concerned or anxious would you be over whether   very unconcerned  very concerned 
 or not your boyfriend/girlfriend would want to meet    1        2       3       4       5       6 
 your parents? 
 
 I would expect that he/she would want to meet my   very unlikely  very likely 
 parents.        1        2       3       4       5        
 
Appendix 5: Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992): 
Each item can be scored on a 7 point scale.  For questions 1-4 and 6, score each strongly agree as 
7 points, each agree as 6, slightly agree as 5, unsure as 4, and so on down to 1 point for strongly 
disagree. 
 
For question 5, reverse the listing as 1 point for strongly agree, and counting up to 7 for strongly 
disagree. 
 
Q1 Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us: 
7=strongly agree, 6=agree 5=somewhat agree,4=unsure 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree 
1=strongly disagree 
 
Q2 The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
 7=strongly agree, 6=agree 5=somewhat agree,4=unsure 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree 
1=strongly disagree 
 
 
Q3 Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not end the perversions eating away at 
our moral fiber and moral beliefs.  
7=strongly agree, 6=agree 5=somewhat agree,4=unsure 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree 
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1=strongly disagree 
 
 
Q4 What our country needs is more discipline, with everyone following our leaders in 
unity. 
7=strongly agree, 6=agree 5=somewhat agree,4=unsure 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree 
1=strongly disagree 
 
 
Q5 There is no "One Right Way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
1=strongly agree, 2=agree 3=somewhat agree,4=unsure 5=somewhat disagree, 6=disagree 
7=strongly disagree 
 
 
Q6 God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before 
it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.  
7=strongly agree, 6=agree 5=somewhat agree,4=unsure 3=somewhat disagree, 2=disagree 
1=strongly disagree 
Appendix 6: Fear of Negative Evaluations (Leary, 1983): 
Read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic it is of you 
according to the following scale” 1=Not at all characteristic of me, 2=Slightly characteristic of 
me, 3=Moderately characteristic of me, 4=Very characteristic of me, 5=Extremely characteristic 
of me 
 
 
 
1. I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t make any difference. 
 
2. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable impression of me. R 
 
3. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings. 
   
4. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone. R 
 
5. I am afraid that others will not approve of me. 
 
6. I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 
 
7. Other people’s opinions of me do not bother me. R 
 
8. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking about me. 
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9. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make. 
 
10. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me. R 
 
11. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me. 
 
12. I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things. 
 
R indicates Reverse Score 
 
Appendix 7: Mortality Salience Manipulation: On the following page are two open-ended questions, 
please respond to them with your first, natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these questions. 
 
 
 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research 
suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount 
about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in 
order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following 
questions will be appreciated. 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF YOUR OWN DEATH 
AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
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2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOU AS 
YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
Appendix 8: Mortality Salience Control Manipulation 1: (tmt.missouri.edu) 
On the following page are two open-ended questions, please respond to them with your first, 
natural response. 
 
We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these questions. 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research 
suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount 
about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in 
order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following 
questions will be appreciated. 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF VISITING THE 
DENTIST AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOU 
PHYSICALLY WHEN YOU VISIT THE DENTIST. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
Appendix 9: General Mental abilities Test (GMAT; Janda, 1996) 
  
  
Problem Solving Task 
  
Directions: The following problem solving task contains five sections, all of which consist of multiple-
choice questions. You have 6 minutes to complete as many questions as you can.  Indicate your answer, 
even if you are not sure whether your solution is correct.   
  
ANALOGIES 
Directions: For the following items, select the alternative that best completes the sentence.  
  
1. Scant is to deficient as sedate is to ___. 
a) serene 
b) moody 
c) frivolous 
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d) flippant 
  
2. Renounce is to accept as imperfect is to ___. 
a) defective 
b) deficient 
c) flawless 
d) scanty 
  
3. Lack is to surplus as renounce is to ___. 
a) abjure 
b) accept 
c) repudiate 
d) abdicate 
  
4. Ascertain is to learn as petty is to ___. 
a) trivial 
b) magnanimous 
c) significant 
d) substantial 
  
5. Essential is to fundamental as endorse is to ___. 
a) sanction 
b) condemn 
c) denounce 
d) reprove 
  
6. Exile is to ostracize as ethical is to ___. 
a) immoral 
b) honorable 
c) promiscuous 
d) lecherous 
  
7. Oppression is to justice as obtain is to ___. 
a) forgo 
b) purchase 
c) procure 
d) acquire 
  
8. Sheer is to opaque as parallel is to ___. 
a) analogous 
b) coinciding 
c) divergent 
d) similar 
  
9. Remit is to retain as nasty is to ___. 
a) repellent 
b) odious 
c) beastly 
d) delightful 
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10. Bat is to human as whale is to ___. 
a) frog 
b) bear 
c) bird 
d) carp 
  
11. Efface is to obliterate as general is to ___. 
a) inexact 
b) exact 
c) extinct 
d) specific 
  
12. Large is to minute as pacific is to ___. 
a) bellicose 
b) halcyon 
c) tranquil 
d) placid 
  
  
  
  
VOCABULARY 
Directions: Each word in capital letters is followed by four words. Pick the word that comes closest in 
meaning to the word in capitals. 
  
13. CABINET 
a) bureau 
b) federal 
c) open 
d) drawer 
  
14. OBSTACLE 
a) impediment 
b) gate 
c) yard 
d) gateway 
  
15. CONTENT 
a) shape 
b) hinder 
c) satisfied 
d) appalled 
  
16. ABDICATE 
a) appease 
b) suggest 
c) dictate 
d) resign 
  
17. LOQUACIOUS 
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a) parsimonious 
b) courageous 
c) verbose 
d) cautious 
  
18. LITURGY 
a) livid 
b) angry 
c) ritual 
d) spoiled 
  
19. PASTORAL 
a) religious 
b) graze 
c) neglect 
d) peaceful 
  
20. MOPE 
a) stupid 
b) relax 
c) clean 
d) apathetic 
  
21. LACONIC  
a) concise 
b) intelligent 
c) colorful 
d) quiet 
  
22. SERPENTINE 
a) treacherous 
b) frightening 
c) misleading 
d) silly 
  
23. MISCREANT 
a) villain 
b) incorrect 
c) ineptitude 
d) fortuitous 
  
24. OSTENTATIOUS 
a) generous 
b) brilliance 
c) pecuniary 
d) pretentious 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
Directions: For each of the following items, select the correct answer. 
  
25. What is the first month of the year that has exactly 30 days? 
a) January 
b) February 
c) March 
d) April 
  
26. What planet has the shortest year? 
a) Earth 
b) Pluto 
c) Mercury 
d) Uranus 
  
27. What is the world’s northernmost national capital? 
a) Stockholm 
b) London 
c) Reykjavik 
d) Oslo 
  
28. To the nearest day, how long does it take the moon to revolve around the Earth? 
a) 1 day 
b) 27 days 
c) 30 days 
d) 365 days 
  
29. What is the Fahrenheit equivalent of 0 degrees Celsius? 
a) -32 degrees 
b) 0 degrees 
c) 32 degrees 
d) 212 degrees 
  
30. How many dimensions does a solid have? 
a) one 
b) two 
c) three 
d) four 
  
31. Who wrote Gone With the Wind? 
a) Sylvia Plath 
b) Scarlett O’Hara 
c) Gertrude Stein 
d) Margaret Mitchell 
  
32. In what month is Groundhog Day? 
a) January 
b) February 
c) March 
d) May 
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33. What is “The Windy City”? 
a) New York 
b) Detroit 
c) Chicago 
d) San Francisco 
  
34. How many miles are there in a kilometer? 
a) .4 
b) .6 
c) 1 
d) 1.6 
  
35. Who holds the record for career home runs?  
a) Babe Ruth 
b) Lou Gehrig 
c) Mickey Mantle 
d) Barry Bonds 
  
36. What two cities were the subject of Dicken’s A Tale of Two Cities 
a) London and Madrid 
b) London and Paris 
c) London and Berlin 
d) London and New York 
  
  
  
  
  
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS 
Directions: For each of the following items, select the correct answer. You may use scratch paper. 
  
37. If 2x + y = 5, then 6x + 3y = ? 
a) 2/5 
b) 3/9 
c) 15 
d) 18 
  
38. One side of a rectangle is 3 feet long and the diagonal is 5 feet long. What is its area? 
a) 6 
b) 7.5 
c) 12 
d) 15 
  
39. Rosanne’s trail mix uses 6 ounces of M&Ms for every 9 ounces of Hershey’s Kisses. How many 
ounces of M&Ms are needed for 75 ounces of trail mix? 
a) 25 
b) 30 
c) 32.5 
d) 36 
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40. The diagonal of a rectangle is 5 feet, and one side is 4 feet long. What is the perimeter? 
a) 12 feet 
b) 14 feet 
c) 16 feet 
d) 18 feet 
  
41. A club of 60 people has 36 men. What percentage of the club is women? 
a) 20 percent 
b) 24 percent 
c) 40 percent 
d) 40 percent 
  
42. The average of 3 single-digit numbers is 7. The smallest that one of the numbers can be is: 
a) 0 
b) 1 
c) 2 
d) 3 
  
43. The hypotenuse of a right triangle is 5 feet long, and its area is 6 square feet. One of the sides of the 
triangle is: 
a) 1.2 feet 
b) 2 feet 
c) 2.5 feet 
d) 4 feet 
  
44. ¼ x ¾ / 4/5 =? 
a) 7/13 
b) 15/64 
c) 15/4 
d) 12/20 
  
46. Which of the following is the largest number? 
a) 13/64 
b) 21/40 
c) 26/70 
d) 51/100 
  
47. Sally is 2 years older than her brother. Twelve years ago, she was twice as old as he was. How old is 
Sally now? 
a) 14 
b) 16 
c) 20 
d) 32 
  
48. There were 16 teams in a basketball tournament. When a team lost, it was eliminated from the 
tournament. How many games had to be played to determine a champion? 
a) 4 
b) 9 
c) 15 
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d) 31 
  
  
  
  
SPATIAL PROBLEMS 
Directions: For the following items, your task is to select the picture on the right that would result if the 
pieces on the left side of the page were put together properly. There is only one correct answer for each 
item.  
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Appendix 10: Working Memory Task 
 
Trail Making Test (TMT) Parts A & B 
Instructions: 
Both parts of the Trail Making Test consist of 25 circles distributed over a sheet of paper. In Part 
A, the circles are numbered 1 – 25, and the patient should draw lines to connect the numbers in 
ascending order. In Part B, the circles include both numbers (1 – 13) and letters (A – L); as in 
Part A, the patient draws lines to connect the circles in an ascending pattern, but with the added 
task of alternating between the numbers and letters (i.e., 1-A-2-B-3-C, etc.). The patient should 
be instructed to connect the circles as quickly as possible, without lifting the pen or pencil from 
the paper. Time the patient as he or she connects the "trail." If the patient makes an error, point 
it out immediately and allow the patient to correct it. Errors affect the patient's score only in that 
the correction of errors is included in the completion time for the task. It is unnecessary to 
continue the test if the patient has not completed both parts after five minutes have elapsed. 
 
Step 1: Give the patient a copy of the Trail Making Test Part A worksheet and a pen or 
pencil. 
Step 2: Demonstrate the test to the patient using the sample sheet (Trail Making Part A – 
SAMPLE). 
Step 3: Time the patient as he or she follows the “trail” made by the numbers on the test. 
Step 4: Record the time. 
Step 5: Repeat the procedure for Trail Making Test Part B. 
 
Scoring: 
Results for both TMT A and B are reported as the number of seconds required to complete the 
task; therefore, higher scores reveal greater impairment. 
 
Average Deficient Rule of Thumb 
Trail A 29 seconds > 78 seconds Most in 90 seconds 
Trail B 75 seconds > 273 seconds Most in 3 minutes 
 
Sources: 
• Corrigan JD, Hinkeldey MS. Relationships between parts A and B of the Trail Making Test. J 
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Clin Psychol. 1987;43(4):402–409. 
• Gaudino EA, Geisler MW, Squires NK. Construct validity in the Trail Making Test: what 
makes Part B harder? J Clin Exp Neuropsychol. 1995;17(4):529-535. 
• Lezak MD, Howieson DB, Loring DW. Neuropsychological Assessment. 4th ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press; 2004. 
• Reitan RM. Validity of the Trail Making test as an indicator of organic brain damage. Percept 
Mot Skills. 1958;8:271-276. 
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Part B: Trial Making Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
